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SUBDIVISION EXACTIONS: A REVIEW
OF JUDICIAL STANDARDS
THOMAS M. PAVELKO*
Suburban fringe areas' are the fastest growing territories in the
United States.2 In order to meet the housing demands of suburban
expansion, subdivision3 development has prospered.' Yet, because of
recurring monetary concerns, unethical developers may try to mini-
mize their costs through defective planning or design.5 To prevent
such defects, municipalities have responded with subdivision con-
* B.A.. Marquette University, 1980; J.D., Washington University, 1983.
1. Deans, Mobility in American Life, in THE FUTURE OF THE CITY 74 (H. Gimlin
ed. 1974). "Fringe areas" describe the suburbs that form a ring, or fringe, around
large central cities. Id
2. See G. STERNLIEB & J. HUGHES, CURRENT POPULATION TRENDS IN THE
UNITED STATES 74 (1978). Between 1960 and 1970, suburbs accounted for 80% of the
total population increase in American metropolitan areas. ADVISORY COMM'N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, IMPROVING URBAN AMERICA: A CHALLENGE TO
FEDERALISM (1976), reprinted in D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING
AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT, at 3 (1979). By 1974, 37% of the national
population resided in the suburban fringes, "while the remainder was divided about
evenly between central cities and nonmetropolitan areas." Id
3. Generally, this term is defined by statute as a division of a parcel of land into
smaller parcels for the purpose of sale or building development. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 40.15.190(2) (1971); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-463.02(A) (1977); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 8.18 (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-1.2 (West 1967); VA. CODE § 15.1-
430(/) (1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 236.02(7) (West 1957); Wyo. STAT. § 15.1-501(a)(iii)
(1977).
4. See II E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 33.04a (Supp. 1981).
5. Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah 1979). See Frey, Subdivi-
sion Control and Planning, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 411, 411; Ledbetter, Subdivision Control
in South Carolina, 24 S.C. L. REV. 155, 165 (1972). See generally Adelstein & Edel-
son, Subdivision Exactions and Congestion Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 147, 157
(1976).
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trols,6 which require developers to make specific improvements or
follow certain procedures prior to plan approval.7 Although such im-
positions initially may appear restrictive, effective use of subdivision
controls benefits the developer, the future residents, and the
community.,
A subdivision exaction is one form of subdivision control, which
requires that developers provide certain public improvements at their
own expense.9 By means of regulation of this type, the subdivision's
6. Subdivision control regulations resemble, but are separate and distinct from,
zoning regulations. See, e.g., 4 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 23.02
(2d ed. Supp. 1981); 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 156.09
(1974). Zoning controls the uses of land and buildings. E.g., Town of Seabrook v.
Tra-Sea Corp., 119 N.H. 937, 941, 410 A.2d 240, 243 (1979). See also Reps & Smith,
Control of Urban Land Subdivision, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 405, 407 (1963) (zoning
involves the negative prohibition of uses). In contrast, subdivision control regulations
monitor the division of land in order to protect against imperfect development and
design. Eg., Town of Seabrook v. Tra-Sea Corp., 119 N.H. 937, 941, 410 A.2d 240,
243 (1979). See generally 4 R. ANDERSON, supra § 23.03 (2d ed. 1968) (objectives of
subdivision control); 4 A. RATHKOPF, LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 71-6 (4th ed.
1975) (reasons for subdivision).
7. Subdivision regulations often require that the developer meet planning or de-
sign provisions, or install public improvements, prior to approval of the plan. See,
e.g., Comment, Money Payment Requirements as Conditions to the Approval of Subdi-
vision Maps: Analysis and Prognosis, 9 VILL. L. REV. 294, 297 (1964). See also IA C.
ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 8A.12 (1982).
8. Frey, supra note 5, at 449. Effective regulations are not so onerous that they
impose undue hardship upon developers. On the contrary, they result in a well-
designed subdivision, so that the property values remain stable rather than depreciat-
ing and jeopardizing the owner's equity. 4 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 6, at 71-8.
9. "Subdivision exaction" describes various municipal impositions upon final ap-
proval of the developer's subdivision plan, which shift capital development costs from
the municipality to the developer. See Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of
Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision
Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119, 1121 (1964); Comment, Subdivision Exactions: The
Constitutional Issues, the Judicial Response and the Pennsylvania Situation, 19 VILL. L.
REV. 782, 784 (1974).
Exactions usually take the form of land dedications or fees in lieu of land.
Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer to Local Governments' Capital Fund-
ing Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 415, 418 (1981). Dedication involves a convey-
ance of an interest in land to the government for a public purpose. The interest may
be an easement or a fee entitlement. 7 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CON-
TROLS § 45.04[2] (1982). See generally 23 AM. JUR. 2d Dedications (1965).
Reservations are a less familiar form of subdivision exaction. Reservations do not
effect a conveyence to the government. Rather, they restrict the subdivider's right to
use the reserved land. Municipalities often require reservations in lieu of dedication.
4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, § 23.25.
Dedications required under subdivision control regulations must be distinguished
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residents enjoy the benefits of municipal facilities' ° while the devel-
oper carries the related financial burden." The exaction, therefore,
does not burden the municipal budget. On the contrary, these regu-
lations prevent developers from thrusting the additional municipal
costs resulting from the subdivision upon present municipal
residents. 12
This Note examines the settings in which municipalities impose ex-
actions " and the judicial standards used to determine their validity. 4
from common law dedications. Common law dedication involves an offer to dedicate
land and a corresponding acceptance by the municipality. Because the developer of-
fers the land, he is estopped from later questioning the municipality's acceptance. In
statutory or compulsory dedications, however, questions of constitutionality and leg-
islative authority arise. 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, § 23.26. Hereinafter, the term
"dedication" shall refer to the statutory form of dedication.
10. See 1 P. ROHAN, supra note 9, § 5.03[3][a]. "When land is subdivided to make
way for new housing development, existing streets must be extended, water and sew-
age facilities must be provided and recreational space must be expanded." Id.
11. Id § 9.01[11]. See supra note 9. These imposed conditions serve to resolve the
difficult problem of financing the extension of public facilities.
In the past, municipalities met the increased financial burden of new develop-
ments by means of long-term debt financing and imposition of higher real estate
taxes on residents. Recognizing the need to apportion the burden more equitably
between existing residents and developers, many state legislatures also enacted
statutes empowering local communities to require developers to dedicate land or
to contribute fees in lieu of dedication.
I P. ROHAN, supra note 9, § 9.01[11].
12. Subdivision controls require an initial determination of the costs for supplying
municipal services to a new development. To the extent that the municipalities re-
quire exactions, "the fiscal well-being of that community may be improved." U.S.
DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, THE FISCAL IMPACT GUIDEBOOK:
ESTIMATING LOCAL COSTS AND REVENUES OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 301 (1979). Fis-
cal considerations have taken a predominant role in subdivision control. Municipali-
ties often lack adequate financial resources to accommodate and maintain necessary
government services. Subdivision controls enable municipalities to pass the costs re-
sulting from subdivision development to the developers. See, e.g., 5 N. WILLIAMS,
supra note 6, § 156.09; Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 9, at 415. This technique
is justifiable because it compensates community residents for capital costs that would
otherwise be borne by existing public facilities. Feldman, The Constitutionality of
Subdivision Exactions for Educational Purposes, 76 DICK. L. REv. 651, 659 (1972).
Ultimately, the subdivider's increased costs fall upon the future residents in increased
housing costs. See, e.g., Marcus, A Comparative Look at TDR, Subdivision Exactions,
and Zoning as Environmental Preservation Panaceas The Search for Dr. Jekyll With-
out Mr. Hyde, 20 URBAN L. ANN. 3, 21 (1980); Comment, supra note 9, at 784. Mod-
em taxpayer revolts, such as Proposition 13, have shown that subdivision exactions
also provide an effective alternative to property taxes. Rose, State Tax and Spending
Restraints.- The Implicationsfor Developers, 10 REAL EST. L.J. 210 (1982).
13. See infra notes 17-57 and accompanying text.
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After this overview, the Note proposes an alternative standard, under
which courts apply a reasonableness test based upon both an evalua-
tion of the municipality's needs resulting from the development and
benefits accruing to the developer and the new residents. The Note
also recommends that courts apply a stricter test when the exaction
seeks land beyond the subdivision plan or equalization fees in lieu of
land.15
I. SUBDIVISION ExACTIONS: AN OVERVIEW
A. Factual Settings Where Subdivision Exactions Arise
Historically, municipalities used subdivision exactions only to ob-
tain dedications 6 of land for streets and sidewalks. 7 These minimal
requirements often failed to protect against poor subdivision plans.18
In response to such problems, many states amended their delegation
statutes to extend municipal authority 9 by allowing further exactions
of land. By requiring more substantial capital outlay, these addi-
tional impositions more thoroughly bind the subdivider to his
plans. 20
This section analyzes the three forms of subdivision exactions: in-
ternal land exactions, 2t external land exactions, 22 and fees in lieu of
land.2" Before a court can intelligently determine the validity of the
exaction, it must ascertain the setting in which the particular exaction
14. Courts uphold reasonable subdivision exactions as valid within the police
power. A municipality's ability to claim the police power is dependent upon state
delegation through an enabling act. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text. If
the exaction ordinance is unreasonable, it is beyond the limits of the police power.
Courts will revoke such municipal ordinances as invalid. See infra notes 66-69 and
accompanying text. See also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415(1922) ("while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far
it will be recognized as a taking").
15. See infra notes 116-40 and accompanying text.
16. See supra note 9.
17. See Melli, Subdivision Control in Wisconsin, 1953 Wis. L. REv. 389, 438. Fur-
ther impositions were considered undesirable because they encouraged evasion of the
platting law and discouraged development generally. Id
18. 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, § 23.01.
19. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
20. 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, § 23.25.
21. See infra notes 25-42 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
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24arises.
1. Land Within the Subdivision Plan
a. Internal Roads and Sidewalks
Subdivision exactions that require dedications of land for internal
roads and sidewalks are the least controversial form of exaction. For
several reasons, courts generally have no difficulty upholding these
requirements.2' First, several state enabling acts define "subdivision"
specifically to include new streets and sidewalks. 26 Second, most mu-
nicipalities require provisions for the development of internal roads
and sidewalks prior to subdivision plan approval.27 Finally, develop-
ers realize that internal streets and sidewalks provide necessary access
from the individual lots to external road systems and therefore com-
ply with the requirement without complaint. 28 Thus, even developers
who bear the added costs usually decline to dispute municipal re-
quirements of access.29
While developers rarely challenge the validity of these "accessibil-
ity" exactions, they view street improvement exactions less approv-
ingly. These exactions typically require street width expansion3 0 or
24. See infra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
25. E.g., Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 186 Conn.
466, 442 A.2d 65 (1982) (extension of internal road approved; court espoused no stan-
dard, but relied upon police power rhetoric). See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 9, at
1122. See generally 0. REYNOLDS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 484 (1982).
26. 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, § 23.31. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 177.031(18) (West Supp. 1981); Ouio REv. CODE ANN. § 711.001(B) (Page 1976);
VA. CODE § 15.1-430(t) (1950).
27. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 9, at 1122.
28. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, § 23.32. Dedication of streets and side-
walks has the reciprocal advantage of relieving the developer of future taxes, liabili-
ties, and maintenance of the dedicated land. Id
29. Id On rare occasions, however, developers have questioned the validity of
exactions that require internal street development. See, e.g., Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 186 Conn. 466, 442 A.2d 65 (1982) (extension of
cul-de-sac to connect two major highways abutting the subdivision); Brous v. Smith,
304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E.2d 503 (1952) (although many lots abutted existing highways,
others were located upon "paper" streets only); City of Staunton v. Cash, 220 Va. 742,
263 S.E.2d 45 (1980) (although city accepted street, it was not incorporated into the
city street system). Because implicit statutory authority exists, courts are hesitant to
disturb the requirements imposed by local authorities. E.g., Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., 186 Conn. at -, 442 A.2d at 67; Brous, 304 N.Y. at 168-69, 106 N.E.2d at 505;
Cash, 220 Va. at 747, 263 S.E.2d at 48.
30. See, e.g., R.G. Dunbar, Inc. v. Toledo Plan Comm'n, 52 Ohio App. 2d 45, 367
19831
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the grading and paving of unimproved streets. 31 In such cases, devel-
opers argue that the required improvements are invalid as unreason-
able exactions, which impose costs for public benefits that are
unrelated to subdivision development.32
b. Schools
Recently, municipalities have begun to require the dedication or
reservation of land within larger subdivisions for school sites or other
educational purposes.33 Developers often raise challenges to these
N.E.2d 1193 (1976) (dedication requirement of a 100 foot wide road through the sub-
division for use as an anticipated major thoroughfare); Gary D. Reihart, Inc. v.
Township of Carroll, 487 Pa. 461, 409 A.2d 1167 (1979) (50 foot width requirement);
Breuer v. Fourre, 76 Wash. 2d 582, 458 P.2d 168 (1969) (60 foot width requirement).
See generally 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, § 23.34.
31. See, e.g., Pima County v. Arizona Title Ins. & Trust Co., 115 Ariz. 344, 565
P.2d 524 (1977) (ordinance requiring the paving of interior streets in all subdivisions);
Glacier Sand & Stone Co. v. Board of Appeal, 362 Mass. 239, 285 N.E.2d 411 (1972)
(requirement of grading, paving, and otherwise improving streets). See generally 4 R.
ANDERSON, supra note 6, § 23.34.
32. See, e.g., R.G. Dunbar, Inc. v. Toledo Plan Comm'n, 52 Ohio App. 2d 45, 51,
367 N.E.2d 1193, 1196 (1976). In A.G. Dunbar, Inc., a typical improvement case, the
developer sought to enjoin the city plan commission from denying subdivision ap-
proval. Id at 45, 367 N.E.2d at 1193. The commission, alternatively, sought dedica-
tion of a 100-foot wide strip of land through the proposed subdivision for later use as
a major highway. Id at 46, 367 N.E.2d at 1194. Because the court viewed the re-
quirement as an unreasonable confiscation of private property, it reversed the lower
court judgment for the defendants. Id at 52, 367 N.E.2d at 1197. See supra note 30-
31.
Statutory dedication conveys a fee interest in the land. The developer conveys the
entire rights of the land, including rights beneath the surface of the street. 4 R. AN-
DERSON, supra note 6, § 23.26. See Pittman v. City of Amarillo, 598 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.
1980) (subjugation of prior private sewer rights to dedication of public street rights).
Municipal requirements of water connections, drainage and sewer systems, therefore,
are often joined to street improvement exactions. See, e.g., Lake Intervale Homes,
Inc. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28 N.J. 423, 147 A.2d 28 (1958) (water
main extensions); Torsoe Bros. Constr. Corp. v. Board of Trustees, 81 Misc. 2d 702,
366 N.Y.S.2d 810 (1975) (water connection charges), modfled 49 A.D.2d 461, 375
N.Y.S.2d 612 (1975); Norco Constr. Co. v. King County, 97 Wash. 2d 680, 649 P.2d
103 (1982) (en banc) (ordinance provided for approval of preliminary plats if the
water system was adequate). See generally Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 122 (1971). Because
these improvements are essential to health and safety, their relation to the police
power is rarely challenged. 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, § 23.43. See supra note 60.
33. See 5 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 6, § 156.08a (Supp. 1981). See also 0. REYN-
OLDS, supra note 25, at 484-85. Municipalities impose the requirement to avoid pass-
ing the costs on to the current property owners, who provide by property tax the
largest single source of school revenue. See D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 738-39 (1977). Municipalities re-
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exactions because most state enabling acts do not explicitly grant to
municipalities the exaction authority for educational purposes.34
Courts have been receptive to this argument and usually hold the
municipal ordinances invalid.35 The ultra vires rationale enables
courts to avoid lurking constitutional issues, such as denials of equal
protection or due process, and taking without compensation.36
Nonetheless, the result is identical to a constitutional invalidation-
the subdivision receives approval without provision of the desired
exaction.
c. Open Space and Parks
Another recent form of subdivision exaction requires dedication or
reservation of land for open space, parks, or recreational areas.37
quire land dedication when the subdivision creates the need for additional school
locations. Smaller subdivisions do not create the full requisite need. Nor do small
subdivisions contain sites of adequate size or location for a school. Therefore, the
municipality may impose fees upon these smaller subdivisions in lieu of the dedica-
tion. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, § 23.42.
34. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
35. 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, § 23.41. See, e.g., Kelber v. City of Upland,
155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957) (school exactions materially change the
map approval requirements of the enabling act); West Park Ave. v. Township of
Ocean, 48 N.J. 122, 224 A.2d 1 (1966) (school exactions without statutory authority
amounted to extortion). But cf. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d
608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965) (enabling statute made explicit reference to schools), ap-
peal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
The constitutional basis for these exactions does not differ significantly from the
rationale behind more familiar forms of exactions. The same methods of analysis,
therefore, apply to school exactions as well. 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 9, § 9.04[3]; 5 N.
WILLIAMS, supra note 6, § 156.08a. See infra notes 79-114 and accompanying text.
See generally Feldman, supra note 12.
36. See infra notes 70-115 and accompanying text. See generally D. MANDELKER,
LAND USE LAW 15-45 (1982).
37. See, e.g., Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 160 Conn. 109,
273 A.2d 880 (1970) (exaction requirement of not more than four percent of the total);
Carlann Shores, Inc. v. City of Gulf Breeze, 26 Fla. Supp. 94 (1966) (exaction require-
ment of five percent of the total area); Smith v. Gwinnett County, 248 Ga. 882, 286
S.E.2d 739 (1982) (reservation of open space in subdivisions larger than 20 acres);
Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964)
(exaction requirement of at least one-ninth of the total area). See also 0. REYNOLDS,
supra note 25, at 484-85. See generally Karp, Subdivision Exactionsfor Park and Open
Space Needs, 16 AM. Bus. L.J. 277 (1979).
Park space exactions are growing in popularity. See 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 9,
§ 9.03[l1. This popularity if represented by "a sharp increase" in ordinances requir-
ing dedication of park sites. Id
1983]
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Park space exactions developed upon the premise that recreation is a
necessary component of healthy community life within the subdivi-
sion,38 and that the proper time for the municipality to preserve open
space is before development takes place. Otherwise, development de-
pletes the locality of available open land.39
The unique nature of internal exactions for park space require-
ments leaves them highly susceptible to judicial attack." The ration-
ale for invalidating these exactions often rests upon evidence that
they are not intended to produce park space, but merely to "freeze"
development or "bank" the land for future development.4 If this is
indeed the case, the exaction is properly classified as invalid. 2 To be
valid, the overriding purpose must be the development of park and
recreational facilities.
2. Land Beyond the Subdivision Plan
Subdivision exactions arose to protect the municipality and its resi-
38. Associated Homes Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 641, 484
P.2d 606, 613, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 636, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971). See
Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 68, 264 A.2d 910, 913 (1970) (an
increased need for community recreation areas is a natural result of subdivision de-
velopment.) But see Berg Dev. Co. v. City of Missouri City, 603 S.W.2d 273, 275
(Tex. 1980) (recreational purposes not a valid exaction purpose). Although tradition-
ally courts review exactions by using a standard of reasonableness, they have a diffi-
cult time applying that standard to park and open space exaction cases. Some
commentators has questioned this perceived difficulty.
If the use of the police power to obtain street space is so routine, why has the
same mechanism to obtain outdoor recreation space proven so troublesome?
.. . [Whereas vehicular rights-of-way are readily justified as to purpose and
width, the court professes ignorance as to why or how much land must be set
aside for outdoor frolic.
Platt & Merkle, Municipal Improvisation: Open Space Exactions in the Land of Pio-
neer Trust, 5 URB. LAW. 706, 709 (1973).
39. Karp, supra note 37, at 278. Planners agree that short-term energy shortages
and continued conservation efforts will increase the demand for local recreation ar-
eas. Id
40. Eg., Admiral Dev. Corp. v. City of Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972) (requirement of one-third of subdivision land for park and recreation pur-
poses held beyond the scope of authority); Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of Englewood, 51
N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 (1968) (ordinance designating land for park use effected a
freeze upon development); East Neck Estates, Ltd. v. Luchsinger, 61 Misc. 2d 619, 305
N.Y.S.2d 922 (1969) (board requirement of dedication of the best land in the subdivi-
sion held confiscatory). See infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
41. See Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951). See also
infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
42. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
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dents from bearing the burdens created by new development.43 Be-
cause subdivision development also affects off-site areas,
municipalities must be able to shift the financial burden of off-site
costs to the developer.' To achieve this end, enabling acts45 and or-
dinances46 often authorize the municipality to exact land in order to
regulate these external effects.
Typically, exactions for land beyond the subdivision arise in re-
sponse to the same types of needs and expenditures as internal exac-
tions.47 The most prevalent type of external exaction provides for the
dedication or improvement of external roadways. Municipalities
generally limit these street exactions to abutting roadways48 and ac-
cess roads.4 9 These exactions are designed to offset additional traffic
burdens, caused by the development, on highways inadequate for the
increased volume. 50
43. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
44. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, § 23.36.
Subdivision controls are imposed on the supportable premise that a new subdivi-
sion is not an island, but an integral part of the whole community, which must
mesh efficiently with the municipal pattern of streets, sewers, water lines, and
other installations which provide essential services and vehicular access. The
regulation of new subdivisions is a process of accommodating the new neighbor-
hood to the developed areas which may be expected to undergo future
development.
Id.
45. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 17-42 and accompanying text. See generally D. MANDELKER
& R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 810 (1979).
48. See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949) (10 foot strip
to widen an abutting highway); Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning
Comm'n v. Washington Business Parks Assoc., 294 Md. 302, 449 A.2d 414 (1982)
(widening an abutting highway); Briar West, Inc. v. City of Lincoln, 206 Neb. 172,
291 N.W.2d 730 (1980) (17 foot strip for widening of abutting street, plus paving and
installation costs); Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 52 N.J. 348, 245 A.2d 336
(1968) (paving an abutting highway). Cf. Valmont Homes, Inc. v. Town of Hunting-
ton, 89 Misc. 2d 702, 392 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1977) (sidewalk along abutting highway).
49. See, e.g., Daviau v. Planning Comm'n, 174 Conn, 354, 387 A.2d 562 (1978)
(ordinance valid even though developer did not own or control the 154 feet of land
needed for right-of-way); Oakes Constr. Co. v. City of Iowa City, 304 N.W.2d 797
(Iowa 1981) (claim by developer that city must establish the needed access street held
invalid); McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 26 Ohio App. 2d 171, 270 N.E.2d 370
(1971) (dedication of 30 foot strip of land for widening an access street).
50. See, e.g., North Landers Corp. v. Planning Bd., - Mass. -, -, 416 N.E.2d
934, 936 (1981) (inadequate access); Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield,
117 N.H. 817, 820, 379 A.2d 200, 202 (1977) (developer refused to upgrade access).
1983]
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3. Land Inappropriate for Exactions
Theoretically, every subdivision increases the need for additional
streets, parks, and schools. 5 Yet developers may be unable to ac-
quire sufficient land to satisfy that need. 2 In this situation, the mu-
nicipality often locates the improvement beyond the development site
to allow maximum accessibility to the surrounding community. A
fee is then exacted53 from the developers building in the area to the
extent that the improvement benefits their land.54
While this technique protects the municipality from due process
and equal protection claims, it simultaneously opens the exaction to
attack as an improper taxation.5 In such cases, courts generally up-
hold the requirement if some special benefit, advantage, or increase
51. See, e.g., Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 68, 264 A.2d
910, 913 (1970) (natural result of subdivision is increased need for recreation needs).
See generally 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, §§ 23.40, 23.42. Each new subdivision
increases the need for municipal services because it represents municipal growth.
Reps & Smith, supra note 6, at 411.
52. See Karp, supra note 37, at 281. Requirements of land from each subdivision,
without regard to their size or shape, would often give the municipality dedication
sites that were too small or improperly located. "The in-lieu fee solves this problem
by substituting a money payment for dedication when the local government deter-
mines the latter is not feasible." Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 9, at 418. See
Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Or. 99, 103, 359 P.2d 108, 110 (1961) (land dedication from
small subdivisions presents problems of maintenance, inadequate surface area and
inconvenient location).
53. Municipalities usually exact fees in lieu of dedication upon a "per lot" basis.
Marcus, supra note 12, at 22. See, e.g., Newport Building Corp. v. City of Santa Ana,
210 Cal. App. 2d 771, 775, 26 Cal. Rptr. 797, 801 (1962) (fee of $50 per lot for parks
and recreation purposes); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 82, 218
N.E.2d 673, 675, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 956 (1966) (fee of $250 per lot to be used for park,
playground, and recreational purposes); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28
Wis. 2d 608, 614, 137 N.W.2d 442,444 (1965) (fee of $200 per lot to be used for school
and park purposes), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
54. Reps & Smith, supra note 6, at 411. See, e.g., Cimarron Corp. v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 193 Colo. 165, 168, 563 P.2d 946, 948 (1977) (in-lieu fees for park
and school space); Coronado Dev. Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 176, 368
P.2d 51, 52 (1962) (in-lieu fees for public open space); Call v. City of West Jordan,
606 P.2d 217, 218 (Utah 1979) (in-lieu fees for flood control facilities).
Where the area served includes prior municipal inhabitants, the danger of unrea-
sonable exactions is increased.
[Tihere is a danger of abuse if local government officials incline toward making
the new inhabitants bear more than a fair share. This is often a likelihood, rather
than a mere possibility, since the officials are members of the local population
which would otherwise have to share the cost.
Comment, supra note 7, at 295.
55. See Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Or. 99, 103, 359 P.2d 108, 110 (1961) (county
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in value accrues to the developer. 56
4. Summary
Subdivision exactions take three general forms: internal land exac-
tions; external land exactions; and fees in lieu of land. Once a court
determines the form of exaction involved, it can then determine
whether that exaction is valid.57
B. Judicial Standards to Determine the Validity of Subdivision
Exactions
When a developer challenges a subidivision exaction, the court de-
termines its validity based upon three factors: whether the munici-
pality has authority to act under a state enabling act; whether the
municipality has properly applied this authority by ordinance; and
whether the exaction is constitutionally valid as a reasonable police
power regulation.58 The developer succeeds in avoiding the subdivi-
sion exaction if the court decides against the municipality on any one
of these issues.59
exceeded its authority when it sought to produce revenue from subdividers). See gen-
erally 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 9, § 9.0113]; Karp, supra note 37, at 281.
56. See, e.g., City of Hallandale v. Meekins, 237 So. 2d 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1970) (no special benefit from large capacity sewers); Fluckey v. City of Plymouth,
358 Mich. 447, 110 N.W.2d 486 (1960) (mere location of road near one's property
does not automatically confer a benefit); NcNally v. Township of Teaneck, 132 N.J.
Super. 442, 334 A.2d 67 (1975) (increase in fair market value demonstrates benefit
from street improvement). See generally D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, supra note
33, at 332-41.
57. See infra notes 58-115 and accompanying text.
58. See 2 P. ROHAN, supra note 9, §§ 9.01[3], 45.01[3]. Because developers typi-
cally plan subdivisions as a business venture, the decision of a court pertaining to the
exaction may be critical to the financial success of the venture. One commentator has
addressed the effect of exactions on the profitability of developments:
From a private developer's standpoint, imposition of [subdivision exactions] by a
municipality can adversely affect the profitability of his enterprise. . . . It is not
surprising, therefore, that developers have sometimes vigorously contested the
legality of each of these devices, usually claiming that they are ultra vires, deprive
the developer of his property without due process of law, or constitute a taking of
public property without compensation.
Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest for a Ration-
ale, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 871, 873 (1967).
59. See, e.g., Snyder v. Owensboro, 528 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Ky. 1975) (lack of
clearly applicable subdivision regulation); Simpson v. City of North Platte, 206 Neb.
240, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (1980) (inappropriate exercise of police power); Hylton
Enters., Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Va. 435, 258 S.E.2d 577, 580 (1979) (no
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1. Municipal Authority Through State Enabling Legislation
A municipality must have state authorization before it can control
subdivisions and impose exactions.6° Typically, a state enabling stat-
ute provides the municipality6' with the authority to approve or dis-
approve proposed subdivision plats.62 Further, the statute often sets
out standards by which the municipality should judge the subdivision
proposal.6
3
Each state has adopted subdivision control legislation. 64 A devel-
statutory authority). See generally IA C. ANTIEAU, supra note 7, § 8A.00; 2 P.
ROHAN, supra note 9, § 9.01[3].
60. See Karp, supra note 37, at 279; Comment, supra note 7, at 297. See generally
0. REYNOLDS, supra note 25, at 160-61; 7 P. ROHAN, supra note 9, § 45.01[3]. The
municipality may protect the public interest through the exercise of the police power,
which it acquires as a subdivision of the state. See Piper v. Meredith, 110 N.H. 291,
295, 266 A.2d 103, 106 (1970).
Because the Supreme Court has never taken a subdivision control case, state courts
often apply the police power standard set in the landmark zoning case, Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
[In Euclid,] the court restated as a general principle that comprehensive zoning
ordinances would be upheld unless found to be "clearly arbitrary and unreasona-
ble, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare."
Reps & Smith, supra note 6, at 406 (citing Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395). After
analyzing the fundamental differences between zoning ordinances and subdivision
controls, some commentators have advocated a more specific test of reasonable rela-
tionship. Reps & Smith, supra note 6, at 407.
61. The power to approve subdivision plats is usually vested in a separate plan-
ning board. If this is not the case, the power is granted to the legislative body of the
municipality. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, §§ 23.04, 23.05; Reps & Smith, supra
note 6, at 405-06.
62. See 7 P. ROHAN, supra note 9, § 45.01[3][b]. The model for most enabling acts
is ADVISORY COMM'N ON PLANNING AND ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STAN-
DARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT (1928).
63. See 4 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 6, at 71-16. These standards include provi-
sions requiring the developer to meet the exactions set by the appropriate local de-
partment. Id See infra note 64.
64. 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, § 23.05. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 11-52-30 to -
36 (1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-463 to 9-463.05 (1977 & Supp. 1982); CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 66475-66478 (Deering 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9 §§ 3001-3004
(1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 69-1214 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 34 § 414 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1981); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.430(101)-(293) (Callaghan 1982); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 89.410 (Vernon 1971); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-501 to -504 (1981); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-37-39 (West Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 711-09
(Page 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10501 (Purdon 1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-
4-303 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-5-1 to -8 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§§ 4413-4424 (1975 & Supp. 1982); VA. CODE §§ 15.1-465 to -485 (1981 & Supp.
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oper cannot claim, therefore, that the municipality has no authority
to control subdivisions. Rather, the developer must argue that the
municipality has surpassed its statutory authority in imposing certain
exactions upon the development.65
2. Municipal Application of Authority Through Ordinances
Municipal ordinances regulating subdivision development must be
enacted pursuant to state enabling acts.6 6 While the state statutes set
forth general standards for determining subdivision plat approval,67
local ordinances establish specific community standards for these de-
terminations.6" Municipalities may use these regulations to advance
any objectives attainable under the police power. Nevertheless, their
1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 58.17.110 (Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE §§ 8-24-28 to
-35 (1976); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 236.45-.46 (Supp. 1982).
When the municipality has home rule powers, the effect of the enabling statute is
unclear. "The courts have usually ruled that a home rule government may seek
power from a state statute as well as from its charter or home-rule provision, and
indeed it would seem inconsistent if a home-rule government were to enjoy less power
than a non-home-rule government in the same state." D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH,
supra note 33, at 180.
65. See, e.g., City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So. 2d 363 (Ala.
1978) (beyond statutory authority to impose fees in lieu of park land); Gordon v.
Village of Wayne, 370 Mich. 329, 121 N.W.2d 823 (1963) (beyond statutory authority
to impose fees in lieu of school land); Briar West, Inc. v. City of Lincoln, 206 Neb.
172, 291 N.W.2d 730 (1980) (statute grants police power to assure proper meshing of
subdivision and community, but not to evade constitutional limits); Hylton Enters.,
Inc v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Va. 435, 258 S.E.2d 577 (1979) (only provisions
explicitly approved by state legislature may be included in subdivision ordinances).
But see Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah 1979) (absence of appli-
cable subdivision control enabling act did not preclude the municipality from requir-
ing exactions when the court could imply the power from the zoning and planning
enabling acts).
66. See, e.g., Admiral Dev. Corp. v. City of Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860, 862 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (ordinance beyond the scope of city's charter provisions); Snyder
v. Owensboro, 528 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Ky. 1975) (no clear subdivision regulation al-
lowed or required the planning commission to request the dedication).
67 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., BERKELEY, Mo., CODE § 22.05 (1973); FLORISSANT, MO., CODE app.
A. § V (1969); ST. CHARLES, Mo., REV. ORDINANCES § 26A (Supp. 1971). A typical
ordinance is set out in Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect.
The plat shall have lettered upon it a statement of dedication properly conveying
all usable lands dedicated for such public uses as streets, public schools, parks or
any other public use, and there shall be attached to the plat a certificate of own-
ership of all such lands to be so dedicated by said plat. Public grounds, other
than streets, alleys and parking areas, shall be dedicated in appropriate locations
by the plat (a) at the rate of at least one (1) acre for each sixty (60) residential
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primary motivation is to provide adequate facilities in a manner that
is financially equitable to present as well as incoming inhabitants.69
3. Application of Statutes and Ordinances-Constitutional
Analysis
Once it has determined that the municipality has based its subdivi-
sion exaction upon a valid ordinance and state delegation of author-
ity, a court must determine whether the exaction is reasonable as
applied to the particular development.7° A reasonable exaction vio-
lates no constitutional or statutory guarantees and is a valid exercise
of the police power.7' If on the other hand it is unreasonable and
723onerous," it fails as an improper exercise of the police power.73 In
the latter instance, the developer may further raise a taking claim.74
In early exaction cases, courts granted perfunctory review of the
constitutional issues through use of the privilege test.75 Under this
approach, courts could give blanket approval for any imposition.
More recently, however, courts have articulated reasonableness tests
building sites or family living units, which may be accommodated under the re-
strictions applying to the land....
22 IlI. 2d 375, 377, 176 N.E.2d 799, 800 (1961).
69. See 4 R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, § 23.03; Note, Subdivision Land Dedication:
Objectives and Objections, 27 STAN. L. REV. 419, 432 (1975). Because of the fiscal
rationale behind municipal exaction ordinances, issues of discrimination or taking
may arise--"whether the subdivision homebuyers, who ultimately finance such exac-
tions, will be required to pay more than a 'fair' share .... "Heyman & Gilhool,
supra note 9, at 1134.
70. See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 9, at 1122.
71. See 6 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 4, § 24.09. Subdivision development falls
within the police power because development affects the general economy. Blevens v.
City of Manchester, 103 N.H. 284, 286, 170 A.2d 121, 122 (1961). See supra note 60.
See generally D. WEBSTER, URBAN PLANNING AND MUNICIPAL PUBLIC POLICY 440-
73 (1958); 82 AM. JUR. 2d Zoning and Planning §§ 7-24 (1976).
72. See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 9, at 1154. Application arguments seek to
demonstrate that the exactions are unfair as applied to the developer. See Comment,
supra note 9, at 788.
73. E.g., Gary D. Reihart, Inc. v. Township of Carroll, 487 Pa. 461,469, 409 A.2d
1167, 1172 (1979) (Larsen, J., dissenting). See P. NICHOLS, LAW OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN § 1.42[2] (rev. 3d ed. 1980). Under a proper exercise of the police power, a
municipality need not provide compensation. Id § 1.42[3).
74. D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 47, at 810. See, e.g., Bethle-
hem Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Lakewood, 626 P.2d 668, 673 (Colo.
1981); Simpson v. City of North Platte, 206 Neb. 240, 245, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301
(1980).
75. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
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designed to determine whether the exaction is a valid exercise of po-
lice power. Generally, the various jurisdictions use three different
tests: the strict need test;76 the specifically and uniquely attributable
test;77 and the rational nexus test.78
a. The Privilege Test
The privilege test emerged when subdivision controls were rela-
tively new forms of municipal regulation. Courts faced with a devel-
oper's challenge to such an ordinance took judicial notice of the fact
that developers voluntarily chose to subdivide their land. By under-
taking this voluntary venture, developers were held estopped from
challenging virtually any condition the municipality placed upon
subdivision plan approval.79 Such superficial review and the ensuing
justification for municipal requirements characterized the privilege
test. This test granted broad discretion to the municipality for ap-
proving and disapproving plans.8" In its broad grant of discretion,
the test also permitted the municipality to burden the developer with
arbitrary and unreasonable conditions.8' Because of this inherent
flaw, the privilege test has since fallen from favor as a primary test of
exaction validity.82
76. See infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
78. See mnfra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
79. See. e.g., Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 42, 207 P.2d 1, 7 (1949); Brous
v, Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 170-71, 106 N.E.2d 503, 506-07 (1952). Subdivision approval
could be so conditioned because it was granted at the discretion of the municipality.
See Marcus, supra note 12, at 54.
80, See D, MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 47, at 810.
81. See Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 48, 207 P.2d 1, 11 (1949) (dissenting
opinion). While the majority applied the privilege test, the dissent argued that the
standard left the developer with three choices: giving the dedication, letting the land
sit idly; or going to jail. In the dissent's view, these unsatisfactory choices amounted
to duress. Id.
82. See Johnston, supra note 58, at 876. The Supreme Court of New Jersey de-
feated an attempt to invoke the privilege in a later case. See West Park Ave., Inc. v.
Township of Ocean, 48 N.J. 122, 128, 224 A.2d 1, 5 (1966). Currently, courts use the
privilege test only as a secondary basis for validating the exaction. See, e.g., Trent
Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 328, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685, 691
(1981); Mid-Continent Builders, Inc. v. Midwest City, 539 P.2d 1377, 1382 (Okla.
1975).
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b. The Strict Need Test
Municipalities often justify subdivision exactions as a necessary re-
sponse to a need or burden created by the influx of newcomers. 83
Some courts have adopted this same rationale, as the basis for the
application of a reasonableness test.84 For a court to hold an exac-
tion valid under this test, the new subdivision must have generated
the need for the additional services.
In Lamplon v. Pinaire,85 the Kentucky Court of Appeals provided
a leading recent example of the strict need test. The Lamplon court
recognized that any substantial subdivision development inevitably
puts additional burdens upon utilities and neighboring streets.8 6
Dedications to the municipality allows development to continue
while eliminating imposition of an unreasonable burden on the com-
munity.87 The court reasoned, therefore, that a dedication or other
exaction is valid only if it "is based on the reasonably anticipated
burdens to be caused by the development."88
c. The Specifically and Uniquely Attributable Test
The specifically and uniquely attributable test is a more restrictive
version of the strict need test.89 Under this method of analysis, a
municipality demonstrates the validity of the exaction if it establishes
that the developer's activities have generated a need, and that the
benefits arising from the exaction accrue directly to the developer and
his property.90
83. See Comment, supra note 9, at 788. The strict need argument is especially
forceful when applied to streets, sewers, pavements, water systems and most internal
exactions. Id
84. See, e.g., Baltimore Planning Comm'n v. Victor Dev. Co., 261 Md. 387, 393,
275 A.2d 478, 482 (1971). Furthermore, the needs examined must relate to the subdi-
vision control enabling act. Id
85. 610 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
86. Id at 919.
87. This is essential for continued development. "Most local governments barely
have funds for necessary maintenance purposes, much less for original construction
purposes." Id at 919.
88. Id The court held that the subdivision regulations were not facially invalid,
but remanded for further consideration of the effect of the regulations as applied.
The court instructed the trial court to use a strict need test in deciding this issue. Id
89. See Karp, supra note 37, at 283-84.
90. See 4 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 6, at 71-55. The principle that justifies the
rule is the special assessment doctrine of tax. See, e.g., Holmes v. Planning Bd., 78
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A strong minority of jurisdictions apply the specifically and
uniquely attributable test.9" Among these jurisdictions, Illinois has
made the most prolific use of the standard.92 The Illinois Supreme
Court's leading decision, Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of
Mount Prospect,93 is still regarded as the seminal case nationwide.94
In Pioneer, the developer asked the court to invalidate an ordi-
nance requiring dedication of land for school purposes.95 He based
his claim upon evidence that the school district had been
overburdened prior to development of his subdivision.96 Because the
A.D.2d 1, 17, 433 N.Y.S.2d 587, 597 (1980). Under special assessment law, the costs
of an improvement may be levied against property if the improvement provides spe-
cial benefit to the property. E.g., White v. County of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 897, 904,
608 P.2d 728, 731 (1980). See J. FORDHAM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 599-600 (2d
ed. 1975).
91. A majority of jurisdictions follow the rational nexus standard. See infra note
105 and accompanying text. Courts have used the specifically and uniquely attributa-
ble test for all fact situations. See, e.g., Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning
Comm'n, 160 Conn. 109, 273 A.2d 880 (1970) (upheld exaction requiring land for
open space, parks, and playgrounds); Carlann Shores, Inc. v. City of Gulf Breeze, 26
Fla. Supp. 94 (1966) (struck down exaction requiring fees in lieu of park space); Mc-
Kain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 26 Ohio App. 2d 171, 270 N.E.2d 370 (1971)
(struck down exaction requiring land for streets); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cran-
ston, 107 R.I. 63, 264 A.2d 910 (1970) (struck down exaction requiring land for recrea-
tional purposes).
92. See, e.g., People ex rel. Exch. Nat'l Bank v. City of Lake Forest, 40 11. 2d 281,
239 N.E.2d 819 (1968) (struck down internal street exaction because land subdivided
merely to allow single house thereon to be marketable); Rosen v. Village of Downers
Grove, 19 I11. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960) (struck down exaction requiring land for
educational purposes); Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 41111. App. 2d 334, 354 N.E.2d
489 (1976) (upheld exaction requiring land for schools and parks), aifd, 68 Ill. 2d 352,
369 N.E.2d 892 (1979). The Illinois courts have explicitly adopted the specifically and
uniquely attributable test as the state standard for determining the reasonableness of
subdivision exactions. Eg., Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 41 Ill. App. 2d 334, 346,
354 N.E.2d 489, 499 (1976), aftd, 68 Ill. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977). But see Plote,
Inc. v. Minnesota Alden Co., 96 I11. App. 3d 1001, 1006-07, 422 N.E.2d 231, 235-36
(1981) (dictum) (the Illinois Supreme Court is currently tending toward a less restric-
tive test).
93. 22 I11. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
94. Pioneer Trust is typically cited as authority when a court applies the specifi-
cally and uniquely attributable test. Eg., McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 26
Ohio App. 2d 171, 174, 270 N.E.2d 370, 372 (1971); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of
Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 67, 264 A.2d 910, 914 (1970).
95. McKain, 26 Ohio App. 2d at 377, 176 N.E.2d at 800-01. See supra notes 33-36
and accompanying text.
96. Id at 380, 176 N.E.2d at 802. "[T]he present school facilities of Mount Pros-
pect are near capacity. This is the result of the total development of the community.
19831
Washington University Open Scholarship
286 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 25:269
need for additional schools arose from factors other than the new
subdivision, the court invalidated the ordinance as applied to the
complaining developer. 97
The New Hampshire Supreme Court recently applied the specifi-
cally and uniquely attributable test in JED. Associates, Inc. v. Town
ofAtkinson.98 There, the town passed an ordinance requiring each
subdivision developer to dedicate seven-and-one-half percent of their
total acreage or pay a proportionate fee.99 Evidence indicated that
the town had no intended use for the acreage.1°° Looking particu-
larly at the "need" requirement of the test, the court held that the
regulation was an arbitrary blanket requirement, which constituted
an unconstitutional taking.101
d. The Rational Nexus Test
The Wisconsin Supreme Court examined the specifically and
uniquely attributable test in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls.10 2
Although the court professed acceptance of that standard, they also
If this whole community had not developed to such an extent or if the existing school
facilities were greater, the purported need supposedly would not be present." Id
97. Id at 381, 176 N.E.2d at 803. "However, this record does not establish that
the need for recreational and educational facilities in the event that said subdivision
plat is permitted to be filed, is one that is specifically and uniquely attributable to the
addition of the subdivision and which should be cast upon the subdivider as his sole
financial burden." Id
98. 121 N.H. 581, 432 A.2d 12 (1981).
99. The regulation required this amount of "land of a character suitable for play-
grounds or for other town use." Id at 583, 432 A.2d at 13 (emphasis added).
100. Id at 584, 432 A.2d at 14. The town's recreation commission had declined
the lot as a park or playground. Plaintiff further argued that the need for open space
was satisfied by large-lot zoning. See Brief for Plaintiff at 5, 8, J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v.
Town of Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 432 A.2d 12 (1981).
101. J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 585, 432 A.2d 12, 15
(1981). Plaintiff raised a second issue regarding removal of a visual obstruction upon
an external access road. The court remanded for a determination of whether the traf-
fic volume had increased and if a new state route in the area cancelled the benefit
accruing to the subdivision. Id See also Brief for the Plaintiff at 22-26, J.E.D. As-
socs., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 432 A.2d 12 (1981).
Chief Justice Grimes, who wrote the opinion in JE.D. Associates, Inc., leads a
majority of the New Hampshire Supreme Court that favors broad construction of
individual property rights and stricter scrutiny of land use ordinances. See Gilrain,
Recent Developments in Land Use Regulation, 19 N.H. B.J. 257 (1978).
102. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
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expressed concern about its rigid elements."°3 Therefore, the Jordan
court put forward a new standard, which required a rational connec-
tion between the new subdivision and the desired exaction." ° The
Wisconsin standard is similar to the specifically and uniquely attribu-
table test in its two-pronged examination of needs and benefits.' °5 It
differs, however, in the degree of evidence required to validate the
police power exercise-the rational nexus test increases the presump-
tion of validity."°
The rational nexus test of Jordan has become the most widely held
standard for examining subdivision exactions. 0 7 Most recently, the
103. Id at 617, 137 N.W.2d at 447. The Jordan majority commented:
We deem this to be an acceptable statement of the yardstick to be applied,
provided the words "specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity" are not
so restrictively applied as to cast an unreasonable burden of proof upon the mu-
nicipality which has enacted the ordinance under attack. In most instances it
would be impossible for the municipality to prove that the land required to be
dedicated for a park or a school site was to meet a need solely attributable to the
anticipated influx of people into the community to occupy this particular
subdivision.
Id
104. Id at 618, 137 N.W.2d at 448.
105. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 9, at 433. "[T]he concept of benefits
received is clearly distinct from the concept of needs attributable. As the Jordan court
recognized, the benefit accruing to the subdivision, although it need not be direct, is a
necessary factor in analyzing the reasonableness [of the exaction]." Id Seegenerally
Karp, supra note 37, at 285-89.
106. See Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 9, at 433. "[O]nce these 'rational
nexi' are established, the burden to disprove the reasonableness of the payment re-
quirement shifts to the developer, according the local government a semblance of the
presumption of validity it enjoys in zoning and other land use matters." Id See also
Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 904 (Utah 1981) (initial
burden on municipality because of its greater accessibility to the required evidence).
107. See, e.g., Ivy Steel & Wire Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 401 F. Supp. 701
(M.D. Fla. 1975) (upheld exaction requiring fees for water pollution control and
sewer connection); Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863 (Fla.
1976) (upheld exaction requiring land for canal purposes); Schwing v. City of Baton
Rouge, 259 La. 770, 249 So. 2d 304 (1971) (struck down exaction requiring street
extension); Glacier Sand & Stone Co. v. Board of Appeals, 362 Mass. 239, 285 N.E.2d
411 (1972) (upheld exaction requiring street improvement); Home Builders Assoc. v.
City of Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. 1977) (en bane) (upheld exaction requiring
land for park and playground purposes); Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plain-
field, 117 N.H. 817, 379 A.2d 200 (1977) (struck down exaction requiring highway
improvement); Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 52 N.J. 348, 245 A.2d 336
(1968) (struck down exaction requiring improvement to external roadway); Jenad,
Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966)
(upheld exaction requiring fees in lieu of park land dedications). See also 181, Inc. v.
Salem County Planning Bd., 133 N.J. Super. 350, 336 A.2d 501 (1975) (excellent state-
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Michigan courts adopted the test in Arrowhead Development Co. v.
Livingston County Road Commission. ' s In Arrowhead, the county
road commission demanded regrading costs for a hazardous road
outside the subdivision,'019 arguing that the hazardous condition
arose solely from the subdivision development." 0 The court, in its
review, adopted the rational nexus test as a "useful analytic frame-
work" for testing external exactions.'1l Here, since the blindspot in-
tersection arose directly because of subdivision development, the
court upheld the exaction based upon the rational nexus between the
hazard and the development." 2
e. Summary
As demonstrated above, courts have often looked to both the cause
ment concerning the breadth of the rational nexus test). See generally Trichelo, Sub-
division Exactions: Virginia Constitutional Problems, 11 U. RICH. L. REv. 21, 27
(1976).
Several courts have described their reasonableness test as a "reasonable relation-
ship test." See, e.g., Coronado Dev. Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 178, 368
P.2d 51, 54 (1962); State ex rel Noland v. St. Louis County, 478 S.W.2d 363, 367-68
(Mo. 1972). These tests do not differ from the rational nexus test. The rational nexus
test originated from concepts developed in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28
Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966). The test's
name arose from language in the opinion. Nonetheless, the ultimate holding in Jor-
dan required a reasonable basis for the exaction. Id at 618, 137 N.W.2d at 447-48.
But see 181, Inc. v. Salem County Planning Bd., 133 N.J. Super. 350, 357-58, 336
A.2d 501, 505 (1975) (rational nexus and reasonable requirement tests are two differ-
ent standards).
108. 92 Mich. App. 31, 283 N.W.2d 865 (1979).
109. The subdivision plan required the opening of an access road. The intersec-
tion created a visibility problem due to the area terrain and grade. Id at 34, 283
N.W.2d at 866.
110. Id While an enabling act existed, the developer argued that it was limited in
scope to internal exactions. Id at 34, 283 N.W.2d at 866. The court did not agree:
The statute itself contains no limiting provision which requires that exactions
take place only within the physical confines of the proposed subdivision ...
We find the absence of limiting language in the statute to be consistent with the
legislature's intent to endow county road commissions with broad authority to
carry out their public duties. To construe the statute to permit exactions only
within the plat would be to impose an arbitrary and unrealistic limitation upon
the road commission's authority. ...
Id at 35-36, 283 N.W.2d at 867.
111. Id at 39, 283 N.W.2d at 868-69.
112. Id at 40, 283 N.W.2d at 869-70. "[Tlhe evidence adduced here clearly estab-
lishes a rational nexus between the creation of Arrowhead Subdivision and the haz-
ardous traffic condition. . . ." Id
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and effect of exactions in evaluating their validity. Resolving the
causation issue requires an investigation into why the need for the
exaction arises. Determining the exactions effect requires identifying
where the benefit accrues. The privilege test incorporates neither
branch in analyzing subdivision exactions." 3 The strict need test
looks only to the causation element."' The specifically and uniquely
attributable test and the rational nexus test, however, incorporate
both cause and effect into their analysis.'
II. A SYNTHESIS
A. Elimination of the Strict Need and Privilege Tests
Courts may reach irrational results if they fail to consider both
need and benefit before determining the validity of an exaction.
Without a determination of need, a municipality could exact land or
money to provide improvements needed before the developer subdi-
vided his land. Similarly, unless courts weigh the benefit resulting
from the exaction, a municipality could, with monetary exactions,
place an improvement so far from the particular subdivision that no
special benefit accrues to its residents. Therefore, courts should avoid
using the strict need test and the privilege test since neither provides
the necessary two-step analysis.
Need, or causation, analysis limits subdivision exactions to those
needs that result specifically from the subdivision development." 6
Benefit, or effect, analysis ensures that the subdivision receives the
requisite relief from this perceived need.' 7 A two-pronged test in-
corporating both standards effectively constrains the reach of the mu-
nicipality to that range of exactions which is irrefutably valid-
exactions imposed to shift the collateral costs of subdividing to the
developer and ultimately the subdivision's future residents who bene-
fit from the development. Both the specifically and uniquely attribu-
table test and the rational nexus test permit this result." 8
The problems inherent in less stringent standards was demon-
113. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
115, See supra notes 89-112 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
117, See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 89-112 and accompanying text.
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strated in Call v. City of West Jordan."' In Call, the city required a
dedication of seven percent of the subdivision land area.' 20 At the
city's option, it could require cash in lieu of land. 121 The city exer-
cised the latter option and accepted money for use in flood control
and park land. 22  Although the need for additional flood control
arose directly from the development, no specific benefit accrued to
the subdivision. 23 Nevertheless, the court decided that the absence
of a special benefit did not impair the ordinance's validity even
though it was not clear that the exaction had a reasonable effect.' 24
The lesson of Call is clear: If benefit is not considered along with
need, the municipality will be free to exact amounts of cash or land
from the subdivider without returning an equal share in benefits.12 5
Other exaction cases, involving land banks or land "freezes," also
satisfy less stringent tests. 126 The New Jersey Supreme Court dealt
with a land freeze case in Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of the City of En-
glewood.127 In Lomarch, plaintiff attacked an ordinance requiring
119. 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979).
120. Id at 218.
121. Id
122. Id at 218.
123. Id at 220.
124. Id The court then used vague and sweeping language in an attempt to jus-
tify its lack of benefit analysis. "[I]t is so plain as to hardly require expression that if
the purpose of the ordinance is properly carried out, it will redound to the benefit of
the subdivision as well as to the general welfare of the whole community." Id
125. A petition for rehearing was granted. Call v. City of West Jordan, 614 P.2d
1257 (Utah 1980) (Call II). In Ca/llI, the court ruled that the holding of Call I could
not be applied without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to show that the exaction
was unreasonable.
Implicit in this rule is the requirement that if the subdivision generates such
needs and West Jordan exacts the fee in lieu of dedication, it is only fair that the
fee so collected be used in such a way as to benefit demonstrably the subdivision
in question. This is not to say that the benefit must be solely to the particular
subdivision, but only that there be some demonstrable benefit to it.
Id at 1259.
126. See, e.g., Simpson v. City of North Platte, 206 Neb. 240, 246, 292 N.W.2d
297, 301 (1980) (dedication of land for proposed thoroughfare was a land banking
operation); 181, Inc. v. Salem County Planning Bd., 133 N.J. Super. 350, 358, 336
A.2d 501, 506 (1975) (benefit branch of the rational nexus test requires specific and
presently contemplated improvements); R.G. Dunbar, Inc. v. Toledo Plan Comm'n,
52 Ohio App. 2d 45, 50, 367 N.E.2d 1193, 1196-97 (1976) (city had taken no action to
propose exact location of major intersection). See also supra notes 40-42 and accom-
panying text. See generaly Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 751 (1971).
127. 51 N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 (1968).
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reservation of park land for the period of one year.128 If the munici-
pality failed to purchase the land or institute condemnation proceed-
ings within the one year period, all rights would revert to the
developer.129 The court invalidated the ordinance, concluding that
its effect would freeze the land without benefiting the subdivision. 3 0
If the court had held the ordinance valid, the municipality thereafter
could have exacted unreasonable amounts of land based only upon
potential benefit.
When courts employ the strict need test or the privilege test, there-
fore, excessive exactions are often upheld.' Courts could avoid this
inequitable result by abandoning these inadequate tests in favor of
the specifically and uniquely attributable test and the rational nexus
test.
B. Application of Different Standards to Different Factual
Situations
It is frequently the case that once a jurisdiction has decided a sub-
division exaction case and has applied one form of the reasonable-
ness test, later courts in the same jurisdiction apply the same test to
other exaction cases, regardless of whether the factual situation is the
same.'32 Courts should abandon this habit and apply different tests
when the facts so require.
When the subdivision exaction pertains to land within the subdivi-
sion, 133 courts should accord more deferential treatment to the mu-
nicipality's interests manifested in the exaction ordinance. The need
128. Id. at 111, 237 A.2d at 882.
129. Id
130. Id If the municipality had begun condemnation proceedings and had
purchased an option from the developer, the just compensation issue would have
been resolved. Id at 113-14, 237 A.2d at 884.
131. It is important to note that cases invalidating subdivision exactions do not
require the court to analyze both need and benefit. If the exaction is invalid under the
need requirement, for example, the court has no reason to examine the benefits as
well. See. e.g., J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 432 A.2d 12
(1981).
132. See, e.g., Krughoffv. City of Naperville, 41 Ill. App. 3d 334, 346, 354 N.E.2d
489. 499 (1976) (Illinois follows the specifically and uniquely attributable test), affid
68 l1. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977); Home Builders Ass'n v. Kansas City, 555
S.W.2d 832, 835 (Mo. 1977) (Missouri follows the rational nexus test). Cf Briar West,
Inc. v. City of Lincoln, 206 Neb. 172, 291 N.W.2d 730, 734 (1980) (unnecessary to
adopt a state rule in this case since issues could be decided on other grounds).
133. See supra notes 25-42 and accompanying text.
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for these internal exactions is likely to arise from the subdivision's
development. Further, a benefit is likely to accrue to a subdivision
when the streets, schools, and parks are located in close proximity to
the development.' 34 Under these circumstances, courts should accord
an increased presumption of validity to the ordinance. The rational
nexus test accomplishes this result,' 35 yet maintains sufficient scrutiny
to ensure the validity of the exaction as applied.
The presumption of validity should be lessened, however, when the
subdivision exaction applies to land beyond the subdivision.' 36 The
somewhat attenuated relationship between the exaction and the de-
velopment warrants less deferential judicial review.131 In this situa-
tion, however, it may be difficult to demonstrate that the
development "specifically and uniquely" benefits from the external
exaction. Application of the specifically and uniquely attributable
test, therefore, may lead to harsh results. 38 To alleviate the problem,
courts should modify the test. Under this modified form, the court
would deem the subdivision exaction to be reasonable if the need for
the exaction arises "specifically and uniquely" from the development
and a reasonable benefit accrues to the development. The practical
effect of this modification would be to increase the municipality's
burden of proof only upon the need branch of the test. 139 The modi-
134. "When land is dedicated for public streets or for the furnishing of water
mains and sewers, their location insures some definite benefit to the rest of the land in
the plat." Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 621, 137 N.W.2d
442, 451 (1965) (Hallows, J., dissenting on other grounds), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S.
4 (1966).
135. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
137. That is, as the benefit's distance from the subdivision increases, the relation-
ship of the exaction to the subdivision decreases. See, e.g., Holmes v. Planning Bd.,
78 A.D.2d 1, 17, 433 N.Y.S.2d 587, 597 (1980) (requiring spatial proximity between
the improvement and the property). This is not a problem, however, when the exac-
tion is internal.
138. See, e.g., Gulest Assocs. Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, 25 Misc. 2d 1004 (diffi-
cult to prove that external recreational facilities will uniquely benefit the subdivision),
affid, 15 A.D.2d 815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1962). See also supra notes 89-101 and ac-
companying text.
139. The rational nexus test relieved the problems of rigidity inherent in the spe-
cifically and uniquely attributable test. Holmes v. Planning Bd., 78 A.D.2d 1, 18, 433
N.Y.S.2d 587, 598 (1980). Additionally, the rational nexus test increased the
problems of benefit analysis. Id The hybrid test set forth in this Note attempts to
rectify this problem as well by specifically introducing a less rigid form of benefit
analysis.
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fication would also assure the subdivider of greater protection when
the potential for harm increases.
When the municipality exacts fees in lieu of land, the relationship
between the fees paid and the benefit to the development may also
become attenuated. This occurs because of the tendency of munici-
palities to apply the fees to the purchase and improvement of external
land.14 A subdivision developer in this situation would be in the
same position as one with an objectionable external land exaction.
Courts should therefore use the modified specifically and uniquely
attributable test discussed above.
C. The Practical Results
The practical effects of these changes would be significant. First,
the demise of the privilege and strict need tests would promote more
equitable decisions. Courts could allow developers to continue de-
velopment, but hold them responsible for the costs arising from their
subdivision. These decisions would provide developers with greater
security in the knowledge that the costs exacted upon them would
also benefit their subdivision.
Secondly, these changes would require the courts to examine thor-
oughly the fact situation presented by the case before determining
which form of the reasonable test to apply. This would have the de-
sirable effect of altering the present judicial practice of undertaking a
cursory examination of the facts before routinely applying the juris-
diction's standard test.
Finally, the use of varying standards for differing fact situations
may have a significant effect upon municipal exaction ordinances.
Often, the ordinances require a fixed percentage of the subdivision
land or an equivalent amount of cash in lieu of land. Such ordi-
nances would not survive under the specifically and uniquely attribu-
table test. Some courts deem fixed exactions to be arbitrary and
unreasonable under the need branch of this test. 4 ' All jurisdictions,
140. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 432 A.2d
12, 15 (1981) (ordinance requiring seven-and-one-half percent of land area struck
down as unreasonable); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 68, 264
A.2d 910, 913 (1970) (a fixed percentage requirement creates inequities which are less
likely to arise under the specifically and uniquely attributable test). See generally
Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods/or Controlling Growth on the Urban Fringe, 1961
Wis. L. REV. 370.
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however, are not in accord. Nonetheless, such ordinances would be
suspect as unreasonable when applied to external lands or fees in lieu
of land.
III. CONCLUSION
It is well established that municipalities can impose subdivision ex-
actions under the police power. When effectively imposed, these ex-
actions benefit both the subdivision and the surrounding community.
They serve to hold the developer responsible for any additional mu-
nicipal burdens without unduly discriminating against the venture.
Courts have used various tests in judging the validity of subdivi-
sion exactions. Of these, only the rational nexus test and a modified
specifically and uniquely attributable test should remain in use.
These tests, when applied in differing factual settings, best ensure that
the exactions accomplish the socially desirable role of shifting the
costs of new developments to the responsible parties when the need
for additional municipal services arises from the developments and a
benefit accrues to them.
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